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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the lower Court abuse its discretion in denying 
Downtown Athletic Club's "Motion for Continuance" and "Motion to 
Compel Discovery" seeking the deposition of Mr. Sidney M. Hormanf 
which had already been completed earlier , and which was not 
sought until after oral argument was had on defendants' "Motion 
for Summary Judgment." 
2. Did the lower Court err in granting defendants' "Motion 
for Summary Judgment," holding that Downtown Athletic Club failed 
to comply with the conditions precedent found in the agreement 
upon which Downtown Athletic Club's complaint is based and the 
alleged oral agreement is void under the Statute of Frauds. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE AND HISTORY OF THE CASE 
On September 9, 1983, Plaintiff and appellant herein, 
Downtown Athletic Club, Inc., (hereafter "DAC") filed the 
complaint against S. M. Horman, S. M. Horman & Sons, and S. M. 
Horman & Sons Company (hereafter "defendants") seeking both 
specific performance and money damages for an alleged breach of 
two purported agreements between the parties pertaining to 
property located in the center of Block 57 in downtown Salt Lake 
City. (R.p. 2-55). Even though the complaint was filed in 
September of 1983, inexplicably service was not made until 
December 6, 1983. (R.p. 58, 59). Defendants answered and 
counterclaimed against DAC and its principal officer David G. 
Yurth for declaratory relief, tortious waste, unlawful detainer, 
and slander of title.(R.p. 75-118). 
Three days after the service of the Summons and Complaint, 
DAC noticed the deposition of Sidney M. Horman. (R.p. 71). Six 
days after service of the summons, DAC served defendants with 
lengthy "Requests for Production of Documents." (R.p. 61-70). 
Defendants responded to DAC's requests, filed their own "Requests 
for Production of Documents" on January 13, 1984, and noticed the 
taking of the deposition of DAC through David G. Yurth, its 
president, on December 15, 1983. (R.pp. 73, 123-134, 135-147). 
Defendants produced requested documents to the plaintiff and DAC 
produced what it claimed to be all of its corporate records, 
consisting of thousands of documents. The deposition of David G. 
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Yurth was taken by defendants on April 2, 1984, (R.p. 607), and 
DAC took Mr. Horman's deposition on April 26, 1984.(R.p. 608). 
No further discovery was undertaken by DAC. On July 19f 
1984f defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment together 
with supporting affidavits and a memorandum of points and 
authorities. (R.pp. 369 and 322-368). At the same time notice 
of hearing was served scheduling oral argument on the motion for 
August 28f 1984f thus providing DAC nearly six weeks in which to 
respond. (R.p. 262). On August 22f 1984f rather than respond to 
the defendants' motionf and only five days before the scheduled 
hearing, DAC's counsel moved to withdraw from the case and for a 
sixty-day extension for DAC to respond to defendants' motion. 
(R.p. 376, 378). The District Court granted both motions on 
August 28, 1984, the date scheduled for the original hearing. 
(R.p. 380). Sixty days, however, lapsed without any appearance 
of counsel for DAC and without any response to the motion for 
summary judgment. 
On October 26, 1984, defendants served notice pursuant to 
U.C.A. S 78-51-36 requiring the plaintiff to appoint counsel. 
(R.p. 382). On November 2, 1984, defendants renoticed their 
Motion for Summary Judgment for hearing on November 16, 1984. 
(R.p. 384). 
Three days prior to the November 16th hearing, Lorin N. Pace 
and William B. Parsons III of the firm of Pace, Klimt, Wunderli & 
Parsons formally appeared as counsel and filed a Motion for 
Continuance and nine notices of deposition. (R.pp. 552, 565, 
554-561, 579-586, and 568-569). The depositions sought by DAC's 
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counsel included, among others, Mr. Sidney Horman, whose 
deposition had already been takenf and Mr. L. R. Gardiner, Jr., 
counsel for the defendants. (R.pp. 565, 568f and 322-368). 
Shortly before the scheduled hearing on November 16, DAC 
filed an Extraordinary Request for Review by which it sought a 
hearing on its motion for continuance even though that motion was 
not timely noticed. (R.p. 387). At the noticed hearing on 
defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment, DAC requested to be 
heard on its reward for extraordinary review and motion for 
continuance. Even though neither had been properly noticed, 
defendants did not object to DAC being heard and DAC's 
Extraordinary Request for Review was granted but its Motion for 
Continuance was denied. Oral argument was presented on 
defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Court took the 
motion under advisement, giving DAC twenty days in which to file 
a written response to defendants' motion. (R.pp. 386, 591). 
On December 7, 1984, DAC filed a Motion to Compel Discovery 
seeking to compel the taking of the deposition of only one of the 
nine depositions noticed just prior to the hearing on defendants' 
motion. (R.p. 393). By this" motion, plaintiff sought only to 
take further deposition of Mr. Horman, who had previously been 
deposed in the case. 
After having obtained still further extensions of time, on 
December 10, 1984, DAC finally filed its Memorandum in Opposition 
to Motion for Summary Judgment, accompanied by eight affidavits, 
several of which were unsworn and unsigned. (R.p* 406). 
Defendants timely submitted their reply memorandum (R.p. 502) and 
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a Motion to Strike the unswornf unsigned and improper affidavits 
of David Yurthr Grant Squires, and Maurice Green. (R.p. 542). 
DAC made no response to the motion to strike and it did not 
correct any of its improper affidavits. 
Following the Court's Memorandum Decision of January 23, 
1985, (R.p. 587), its Order and Summary Judgment was entered on 
February 6, 1985. (R.p. 590). The Court denied plaintiff's 
motion to further depose Mr. Horman (R.p. 595); granted the 
defendants' motion to strike the two unsigned and unsworn 
affidavits (the Green and Squires affidavits), the affidavit of 
Mr. Yurth purporting to verify the unsigned affidavits, and those 
portions of the second Yurth affidavit that did not comply with 
Rule 56(e) (R.p. 596); and granted summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants. (R.p. 597). The District Court held that: 
Rule 56 requires that when a motion for summary 
judgment is made and supported, as provided in the 
rule, which is the case here, the response must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a "genuine" 
issue for trial. Rule 56 requires judgment if there is 
no "genuine" issue as to "material" facts. The motion 
for summary judmentfsic] has been amply supported, as 
provided in the rule, and shows that there can be no 
genuine issue that plaintiff has failed to comply with 
several conditions precedent in the agreements upon 
which plaintiff's complaint is based, and that the 
alleged oral agreement or modification fails to meet 
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. The 
plaintiff's response has not shown that there is a 
genuine issue as to any material fact, and the motion 
for summary judgment must therefore be granted. There 
is no just reason for delay in entry of this judgment, 
and summary judgment in favor of defendants on 
plaintiff's complaint should be entered at this time. 
(R.pp. 596-597). 
In denying the motion to compel the additional deposition of Mr. 
Horman, the Court noted that: 
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w[t]he deposition of Mr. Horman was taken in this case 
by previous counsel for plaintiff on April 26, 1984. 
Plaintifff during the entire time that the motion for 
summary judgment was pending, made no further effort to 
take further deposition of Mr. Horman or to undertake 
further discovery until the filing of various notices 
of taking depositions three days before the hearing on 
the motion for summary judgment on November 16, 1984. 
The affidavit filed by plaintiff's counsel does not 
state any specific area of inquiry that is essential to 
a ruling on the motion for summary judgment or that is 
otherwise relevant to this action and which was not 
inquired into in the prior deposition. There is, 
therefore, no adequate showing that the Court's prior 
order denying plaintiff's motion for continuance should 
be altered, and there is no adequate showing that there 
is any information material to a disposition of the 
motion for summary judgment that has not previously 
been covered in the extensive deposition heretofore 
taken of Mr. Horman. The Court, having considered said 
motion and affidavits, hereby denies the motion to 
compel further deposition of Mr. Horman upon the ground 
that the motion is contrary to the previous order of 
the Court denying continuance of the hearing on the 
motion for summary judgment and upon the ground that 
nothing in the motion or affidavit in support thereof 
shows any adequate grounds or basis for the granting of 
said motion. (R.p. 595). 
DAC filed its Notice of Appeal on March 8, 1985. 
(R.p. 599). 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendants submit the following statement of facts and 
note that DAC has not provided the court with a proper statement 
but has interposed "responses" and arguments at various points, 
making its presentation argumentative. 
DAC's Articles of Incorporation were filed in March of 1980, 
with formal organization of the corporation becoming effective 
September of 1980. The chief directing officer of DAC was its 
president, David G. Yurth, who had made several prior 
unsuccessful attempts to organize an athletic club. (Yurth 
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deposition pp. 18-24; R.p. 607). After formal incorporation, 
Mr, Yurth commenced his efforts to find a location in which to 
place a proposed athletic club. Attention became centered on the 
Harver Warehouse Building and other buildings either under lease 
to or owned by entities related to Mr. Sidney M. Horman. Mr. 
Yurth approached Mr. Horman concerning the possibility of using 
some of his building space in which to construct an athletic 
club. (Yurth deposition p. 59; R.p. 607). After discussions 
with Mr. Horman, Mr. Yurth was eventually allowed to use, on a 
temporary basis, vacant office space on the second floor of the 
Keith Warshaw Building, or the Kress Building as it was 
historically known. (Yurth deposition pp. 77-78; R.p. 607). 
Somewhat later, on May 8, 1981, a written instrument entitled 
"Construction and Lease Agreement for the Downtown Athletic Club11 
(hereafter referred to as "Construction and Lease Agreement;" 
Exhibit 11, Yurth deposition, Appendix "A"1), pertaining to the 
use of the Harver Warehouse Building for the construction of an 
athletic club, was executed. This instrument incorporated the 
prior understanding that DAC could utilize office space in the 
old Kress Building on a strict'ly temporary basis for a payment of 
$1.00 per month rent until the main term of the lease began. 
(Paragraph V A, pp. 3-4, Exhibit 11 to Yurth deposition, R.p. 
607; Appendix "A"). The Construction and Lease Agreement also 
*A copy of the Construction and Lease Agreement is attached as 
Appendix "A," it is attached because the copy presented by DAC as 
an attachment to its brief is inaccurate in that it does not 
contain all of the handwritten modifications made to the 
agreement at the time of signing, see e.g. page three of the 
agreement. 
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articulated several conditions precedent which DAC had to 
accomplish before S. M. Horman & Sons Co. became obligated to 
construct any of the planned improvements or before the lease was 
to commence. Those conditions precedent were as follows: 
It The temporary occupancy "of the office space" in the 
Kress Building was conditioned on the payment of rent of $1.00 
per month. (Paragraph 5A, p.3/ of the Construction and Lease 
Agreement, Exhibit 11 to Yurth Deposition, Appendix "A"; Yurth 
Deposition p. 77, R.p. 607; Horman deposition p. 193, R.p. 608). 
2. The improvements to be made by S. M. Horman & Sons 
Company under the agreement were to be made only "provided that 
the Harver Building can be reinforced at a price that is 
acceptable to Lessor [S. M. Horman & Sons Company] and Lessee 
[DAC] and in a manner which will satisfy the requirements of the 
Salt Lake City Building Department." (Paragraph 3Ar of the 
Construction and Lease Agreement, Exhibit 11 to the Yurth 
Deposition; Appendix "A"; Yurth deposition p. 159; R.p. 607). 
3. Construction by S. M. Horman & Sons Company was to 
commence only after "confirmed receipt and acceptance by Lessor 
[S. M. Horman & Sons Company] of construction financing 
acceptable to Lessor [S. M. Horman & Sons Company]," and the 
entire lease was specifically "subject to Lessor [S. M. Horman & 
Sons Company] being able to secure sufficient financing . . . at 
a rate not to exceed twelve percent (12%) per annum . . . ." 
(Paragraph IV and VI(F), pp. 3 and 5 of the Construction and 
Lease Agreement, Exhibit 11 to the Yurth Deposition; Appendix 
"A"). 
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4. S. M. Horman & Sons Company was required to proceed 
with construction under the agreement only if the plaintiff 
"shall sell a sufficient number of memberships prior to beginning 
of construction • . . to guarantee that payments required by this 
contract will be paid." (Paragraph IV, p. 3 of the Construction 
and Lease Agreement, Exhibit 11 to Yurth deposition; Appendix 
"A") . 
5. DAC was required "to assign dues income in a sufficient 
amount to guarantee said payments according to individual 
membership contracts by contract number to a special account 
designated solely for the payment of monthly lease payments due 
and payable under the lease.M (Paragraph IV, p. 3 of the 
Construction and Lease Agreement, Exhibit 11 to Yurth deposition; 
Appendix "A"; Yurth deposition p. 83; R.p. 607). 
None of these conditions precedent to the defendants1 
performance under the Construction and Lease Agreement have ever 
been performed, 
1. The plaintiff did not pay the $1.00 per month rental 
required by the temporary occupancy of the Kress Building office 
space. (Horman deposition p. 140; R.p. 608). The purported 
receipt of the monthly rent of the temporary facilities 
supposedly signed by defendant S. M. Horman, as agent for S. M. 
Horman & Sons Company, filed with the Court was forged by DAC and 
was not signed by Mr. Horman. (Affidavit of George J. 
Throckmorton, R.p. 311; Horman deposition p. 186, R.p. 608). 
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2. The Harver building could not be reinforced at a price 
acceptable to the Lessor (S. M. Horman & Sons Company). (Horman 
deposition p. 2, R.p. 608; Yurth deposition p. 194r R.p. 607). 
3. The only engineering studies performed showed that the 
Harver Building could not be made structurally sound within a 
reasonable price range. (Yurth deposition, pp. 165-167 and 194f 
R.p. 607). 
4. No written engineering studies or completed drawings 
providing for adequate structural reinforcement of the Harver 
Building were submitted to Salt Lake City, and Salt Lake City has 
never received or approved any plans for the renovation of the 
Harver Building. (Affidavit of Roger R. Evans, Assistant 
Director of the Department of Building and Housing Services for 
Salt Lake City Corporation, R.p. 290). 
5. S. M. Horman & Sons Company did not receive or accept 
construction financing acceptable to it. (Horman deposition pp. 
125-126, R.p. 608). 
6. Neither S. M. Horman & Sons Company nor DAC were able 
to secure sufficient financing at a rate not to exceed 12% per 
annum, or at a rate which was acceptable to S. M. Horman & Sons 
Company. (Yurth deposition, pp. 207, 224, 227, 229, 233, 235, 
239, 240, 254; R.p. 607; Horman deposition p. 74; R.p. 608). 
7. DAC did not at any time assign dues income in a 
sufficient amount, or any amount whatever, according to 
individual contract or any other manner to a special account 
designated solely for the payment of lease properties. (Yurth 
-10-
deposition p. 82 and 84, R.p. 607; Horman deposition pp. 90-91, 
181 and 183, R.p. 608). 
When it became clear that DAC was not going to be able to 
perform as required under the Construction and Lease Agreement, 
Mr. Yurth broached the possibility of an assignment of part of 
the Harver Warehouse master lease to DAC. The possibility of an 
assignment was discussed by DAC and S. M. Horman & Sons Company, 
but no agreement to assign was ever reached or reduced to 
writing. Even if for purposes of this motion plaintiff's 
contention that the discussions concerning the possibility of an 
assignment of part of the Harver master lease constitute an oral 
agreement to assign is accepted, there were specific material 
conditions precedent acknowledged by both DAC and the defendants 
which conditioned the assignment of the lease. Those conditions 
were as follows: 
1. That the owners of the Harver Building absolutely and 
completely release S. M. Horman & Sons Company from all 
obligations under the lease and accept the proposed assignee 
(DAC) as the new lessee in place of S. M. Horman & Sons Company. 
(Paragraph 4 Section 1, Exhibit 15 to Yurth deposition, R.p. 607; 
Horman deposition pp. 114, 175, 195, R.p. 608; affidavit of Brent 
Dyer, R.p. 285). 
2. That engineering studies be completed and approved by 
the City for the renovation of the Harver Building. (Yurth 
deposition p. 192, Paragraph (2), Exhibit 1 to Yurth deposition, 
R.p. 607). 
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3. That adequate financing for the completion of the 
project be secured. (Yurth deposition p. 192; R.p. 607). 
None of the material conditions precedent to the alleged 
oral assignment were ever fulfilled. The owners of the Harver 
lease refused to release S. M. Horman & Sons Company from any 
obligation under the lease or to accept DAC as a lessee in place 
of S. M. Horman & Sons Company (Horman deposition p. 19f R.p. 
608). The engineering studies were never completed and never 
sent to the City for approval (Affidavit of Roger Evans; R.p. 
290). Adequate financing was never provided. (Yurth deposition 
pp. 207, 224, 227, 229, 233, 235, 239, 240 and 254; R.p. 607; 
Affidavit of Sherman Gillman, officer in Transamerica Occidental 
Life Insurance Company, Inc., R.p. 319) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying DAC's motion for continuance and motion to compel the 
taking of Sidney M. Horman's deposition. Mr. Horman's deposition 
had been taken and completed on April 26, 1985, seven months 
prior to the hearing on defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
and seven months before the filing of the Motion to Compel 
Discovery. Three days prior to the hearing on defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment, DAC filed nine notices of deposition and 
its Motion for Continuance of the hearing. DAC's Motion for 
Continuance was denied but it was permitted to file written 
response to the motion. DAC, thereafter, filed a Motion to 
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Compel seeking only the deposition of Mr. Hormanf thereby waiving 
any claim to the other depositions. DAC's untimely Motion to 
Compel was denied for failing to demonstrate any basis for or 
area of inquiry to justify the retaking of Mr, Horman's 
deposition. Thusf the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying DAC's motions and refusing to compel the 
retaking of Mr. Horman's deposition where his deposition had been 
completed and no area of inquiry was articulated which was either 
relevant or pertinent to the pending Motion for Summary Judgment. 
2. The District Court did not err in granting defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Five clear, unequivocal conditions 
precedent were established by the Construction and Lease 
Agreement entered into by the parties, the failure of any one of 
which would automatically terminate the agreement and release the 
defendants from any obligation to perform. None of those 
conditions precedent were performed. The alternative oral 
agreement or assignment alleged by DAC, which necessarily 
abrogated the prior written Construction and Lease Agreement, is 
void and unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. Furthermore, 
that alleged oral agreement "to assign contained conditions 
precedent which were not met by the plaintiff, thus, releasing 
the defendants from any obligation to perform. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
DAC'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE AND MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY, 
As was outlined in the chronology of the proceedings of this 
case, extensive discovery was conducted by both parties which 
ended with the taking of Mr. Sidney M. Horman's deposition on 
April 26, 1984. After the lapse of three months the defendants 
moved for summary judgment on July 19, 1984, and scheduled oral 
argument for August 28, 1984, giving DAC six weeks in which to 
respond. A sixty-day extension of time from August 28, 1984, was 
granted by the District Court upon motion by DAC. (R«p* 380). 
On November 2, 1984, more than four months after the filing of 
the motion for summary judgment, and with absolutely no action on 
the part of DAC to respond to the motion or otherwise plead, 
defendants again noticed their motion for oral argument for 
November 16, 1984. At the last minute DAC again sought an 
extension of the hearing. 
Counsel for DAC moved for a continuance at the time of the 
hearing and stated as a basis for the motion that he could not 
respond to the motion and that he need additional time to 
complete the nine depositions he had noticed three days before 
the oral argument. 
At the November 16, 1984, hearing, the District Court 
considered DAC's Extraordinary Request for Review and Motion for 
Continuance. (R.pp. 386, 391). The request for review was 
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granted, but the Court declined to continue the hearing on the 
Motion for Summary Judgment, preferring to hear counsel's 
position with respect to that motion. (R.pp. 386, 391). The 
Court did, however, give DAC an additional twenty days to submit 
a written response. (R.pp. 386, 391). DAC sought and was 
granted still another extension to file its memorandum. It did 
file within the twenty days, however, a Motion to Compel the 
taking of the deposition of one of the nine depositions that had 
been noticed three days prior to the scheduled hearing on 
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. In seeking by motion to 
compel only one of the nine depositions noticed, plaintiff 
thereby necessarily conceded the lack of merit in its prior 
motion to continue the hearing in order to take nine depositions 
and acknowledged the appropriateness of the District Court's 
ruling. The sole deposition sought was the further deposition of 
Mr. Horman, who had previously been deposed more than seven 
months prior to the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DAC's Motion to Compel was never noticed for hearing, and no 
oral argument was heard. DAC's Counsel offered his affidavit in 
support of the motion to the effect that the April 26, 1984, 
deposition of Mr. Horman was not complete and needed to be 
continued. (R.p. 395). Counsel's affidavit, however, did not 
articulate or even suggest any area of inquiry that was not 
covered in the prior deposition or that was in need of further 
exploration. There was no indication that even the unspecified 
areas of inquiry were relevant to the issues presented on the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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The deposition six months earlier of the 80 year old Mr. 
Horman had been exhaustive in both its breadth and depth of 
inquiry and consumed an entire day and 243 pages of deposition 
transcript. As pointed out by the affidavit of defendants' 
counsel/ it was inconceivable that any further area of relevant 
inquiry could possibly exist. Furthermoref defense counsel's 
affidavit made it clear that at the end of the deposition session 
on April 26, 1984, the deposition was not continued indefinitely. 
At the time the deposition was noticed, plaintiff's counsel had 
instructed and required that Mr. Horman and his lawyer be 
available for two full days. Schedules were rearranged to meet 
that demand. Plaintiff's counsel, however, obviously having 
exhausted every conceivable avenue of inquiry, and having cross-
examined the witness with reference to eighteen document 
exhibits, abruptly terminated the deposition at 4:30 p.m. on the 
first day and advised that he did not wish to proceed further at 
that time. It was made clear that Mr. Horman was prepared to 
proceed further that day and the next as scheduled by DAC's 
counsel, but DAC chose not to proceed. 
Faced now with the necessity of producing some reasonable 
objection to the District Court's ruling, in light of the 
District Court's lenient permission in granting extensions of 
time to respond in writing to the defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, counsel for DAC has endeavored to justify its demand 
for the further deposition of Mr. Horman. Statements of Mr. 
Horman's counsel reciting the witness's previous availability as 
demanded by DAC's counsel and the absence of any need for further 
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deposition were not challenged by DAC. If DAC seriously believed 
that the prior deposition was continued and that further inquiry 
was necessary, it would have acted promptly to complete its 
inquiry rather than wait more than seven months to raise the 
issue. A deposition can not be continued indefinitely. 
In challenging this ruling DAC cites Cox v. Winters, 
678 P.2d 311, 313 (Utah 1984), and Auerbach's v. Kimball, 572 
P.2d 376 (Utah 1977) which it claims stand for the proposition 
that it is an abuse of discretion to enter summary judgment where 
discovery is not completed. 
In order to properly consider DAC's challenge of the 
District Court's rulings, it is expedient to establish what DAC 
is contending and what it is not at issue. First, DAC does not 
contend that it was denied an opportunity under Rule 56(f), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, to obtain affidavits or other discovery 
to oppose the motion for summary judgment, as was the case in Cox 
v. Winters, supra. DAC did not present to the Court, as required 
by Rule 56(f), any acceptable "reason" why it either needed the 
specific nine depositions it noticed at the last minute, and 
thereafter abandoned when it sought by motion to compel only the 
deposition of Mr. Horman, or why it could not present, without 
those depositions, facts essential to justify its opposition to 
the defendants' motion. The notices of deposition were obviously 
not related to the defendants' motion for summary judgment in 
that DAC did not pursue them and waived its right to compel their 
taking. The unsigned affidavits submitted by DAC with Mr. 
Yurth's assurances that the affiants would sign the affidavits if 
-17-
they could have been found are not proper under Rule 56(e) and do 
not invoke Rule 56(f) to require the suspension of consideration 
of the motion for summary judgment until the signatures could be 
obtained. No acceptable "reason" was presented why the 
signatures were not obtained. In additionr Mr. Yurth's 
assurances that the affiants would sign the prepared affidavits 
is disingenuous because the affiants in reality either could not 
or would not sign them. For example, Mr. Maurice Green could not 
have signed the affidavit prepared for him because it is 
absolutely clear from the uncontroverted affidavit of Mr. Sherman 
Gillman of Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Company, (R.p. 
319), that Mr. Green was never employed by Transamerica 
Occidental Insurance Life Co. as a loan officer and never 
obtained a loan commitment from Transamerica as represented in 
his unsigned affidavit. Mr. Grant Squires, a local residentr who 
has always been available for signing the affidavit prepared by 
DAC, informed defendants' counsel that he had refused to sign 
that proffered affidavit. Thus, there is no appropriate claim 
under Rule 56(f) for affidavits or discovery to oppose 
defendants' motion since DAC has never presented any acceptable 
reason why the motion should not be heard until certain 
affidavits or discovery are obtained. 
Since Rule 56(f) is not at issue, the only issue that DAC 
could apparently be raising is that since it has not completed 
its general discovery the case can not be ripe for summary 
judgment. The cases cited by DAC in support of this proposition, 
Cox and Auerbach'Sr hold almost completely the opposite. 
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In Cox the court quoted Strand v. Associated Students of 
University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 194 (Utah 1977), citing 6 Part 
2 Moore's Federal Practice (2d ed.) § 56.24, pp. 56-1424 to 15-
1426 [sic], and stated that: 
Where, however, the party opposing summary 
judgment timely presents his affidavit under Rule 56(f) 
stating reasons why he is presently unable to proffer 
evidentiary affidavits he directly and forthrightly 
invokes the trial court's discretion. Unless dilatory 
or lacking in merit the motion should be liberally 
treated. Exercising a sound discretion the trial court 
then determines whether the stated reasons are 
adequate. 
As noted DAC did not present any affidavit or move the court for 
relief under Rule 56(f) and in its motion for continuance and 
motion to compel gave no reason why the taking of any of the 
depositions had any relevance to the motion for summary judgment. 
It can hardly be contested that DAC's notices and motion to 
compel were dilatory. They were both filed more than four months 
after defendants' motion for summary judgment was filed and seven 
months after the last discovery was taken. Finally, Cox 
admonishes the exercise of sound discretion in determining if the 
"reasons stated for additional discovery are adequate." Here, 
where no reasons were offered,.'the District Court was proper in 
not granting additional discovery. 
Cox and Auerbach's recognize three other instances where 
the entry of summary judgment in the face of requests for 
discovery would be an abuse of discretion:* first, where there 
has "not been sufficient time since the inception of the lawsuit 
for plaintiff to utilize discovery procedures, and thereby have 
an opportunity to cross examine the moving party," Id. at 313? 
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second, where "discovery proceedings were timely initiated, but 
never afforded an appropriate response/1 Id, and third, where 
discovery sought is relevant to the issues presented in the 
motion for summary judgment and not a "'fishing expedition1 for 
purely speculative evidence after substantial discovery has been 
conducted without producing any significant evidence." See also. 
First National Bank v. Cities Services, 391 U.S. 253 (1968) cited 
in Cox v. Winters, supra, at n. 9. 
None of these three instances have any application here 
other than the fact that they all indicate that the District 
Court properly exercised its discretion. DAC had ample time to 
complete discovery in the eleven months after the suit was filed 
and prior to the defendants' filing of its motion. Again, DAC 
did nothing in the three months prior to defendants filing of 
their motion and then did nothing the following four months after 
its filing. It is noteworthy that defendants did not follow the 
practice of some litigants, who give only the shortest possible 
notice for hearing on a motion for summary judgment, but gave DAC 
nearly six weeks notice; that the hearing was extended at 
plaintiffs' request an additional sixty days; and that even the 
second notice of hearing gave DAC more than two weeks in which to 
respond. The last minute filing of notices of deposition just 
before the hearing on the motion is clearly dilatory conduct on 
the part of DAC. There was no outstanding, unresponded to 
discovery in existence prior to the filing of the motion for 
summary judgment, as was found in the case of both Cox and 
Auerbach's. In those cases, the outstanding discovery went to 
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the various issues under consideration in the motion, and thus, 
it was not proper for the court to enter summary judgment until 
the discovery was properly responded to. Here, however, 
Defendants had openly and fairly responded to all discovery 
propounded by DAC, and DAC had not only the opportunity to but 
did in fact "cross examine the moving party." DAC's last minute 
and furtive attempt to give the appearance that discovery was 
needed or incomplete was shown for what it is — an attempt to 
delay the proceeding. DAC's abandonment of its untimely filed 
discovery with its motion to compel being directed only to Mr. 
Horman's further deposition demonstrates that the entire proposal 
was nothing more than a "fishing expedition" frequently utilized 
to avoid the salutary impact of summary judgment—a practice the 
courts will not sanction. Cox v. WinterSr 678 P.2d 311, 314 
(Utah 1984), citing First National Bank v. Cities Services, 391 
U.S. 253, 289 (1968). 
The District Court gave careful consideration to DAC's 
efforts to delay the hearing. Since DAC offered no reasons for 
the taking of the untimely filed discovery or its relevance to 
issues raised in the motion for summary judgment, the District 
Court in the exercise of its discretion properly denied DAC's 
motions. The court did, however, withhold decision and gave DAC 
liberal and extended opportunity to make written response. That 
decision is above reproach. 
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II- THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 
The Order and Summary Judgment which DAC appeals from 
articulated the basis for the granting of the Motion for Summary 
Judgment• 
Rule 56 requires that when a motion for summary 
judgment is made and supported, as provided in the 
rule, which is the case here, the response must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a 'genuine' 
issue for trial. Rule 56 requires judgment if there is 
no 'genuine' issue as to 'material' facts. The motion 
for summary judgment has been amply supported, as 
provided in the rule, and shows that there can be no 
genuine issue that plaintiff has failed to comply with 
several conditions precedent in the agreements upon 
which plaintiff's complaint is based, and that the 
alleged oral agreement or modification fails to meet 
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. The 
plaintiff's response has not shown that there is a 
genuine issue as to any material fact, and the motion 
for summary judgment must therefore be granted. There 
is no reason for delay in entry of this judgment, and 
summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff's 
complaint should be entered at this time." (R.pp* 
596-597). 
It is axiomatic that when considering a motion for summary 
judgment the Court must grant the motion where: 
[t]he pleadings and all other submissions show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. 
Healer Ranch. Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980) 
(Footnotes omitted). It is equally clear that summary judgment 
should not be precluded "simply whenever some fact remains in 
dispute, but only when a material fact is genuinely 
controverted." Id. (Emphasis added). See also. Kesler v. 
Kesler, 583 P.2d 87 (Utah 1978), citing Disabled American 
Veterans v. Hendrixson, 340 P.2d 416 (Utah 1959). As has been 
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stated by this Court recently in Webster v. Sill* 675 P.2d 1170, 
1172 (Utah 1983): 
A major purpose of summary judgment is to allow the 
parties to pierce the pleadings to determine whether 
there is a genuine issue of fact. To raise a genuine 
issue of fact, an affidavit must do more than reflect 
the affiant's opinions and conclusions . . . . The 
affidavit must 'set for the specific facts' showing 
there is a genuine issue for trial. Utah R. Civil P. 
56(e). The mere assertion that an issue of fact exists 
without a proper evidentiary foundation to support that 
assertion is insufficient to preclude the granting of a 
summary judgment . . . .If (Citations omitted). 
In keeping with the purpose of piercing the pleading on a 
summary judgment motion, the courts lay great emphasis on the 
fact that an issue of fact must be "genuine" and "material." In 
the often quoted language of Justice Cardozo concerning the 
raising of a genuine issue of fact the issue asserted by the 
opposing party must not be "feigned, and that there is in truth 
. . . [something] to be tried." Currey v. McKenzie, 146 N.E. 
375, 376 (N.Y. 1925). 
As was noted by this Court in Webster, above, care should be 
taken that issues raised are based on real and substantial facts 
and not merely the opinions or conclusions of the affiant. Also, 
the courts are admonished that 
An Affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment must set forth facts that would be admissible 
in evidence. 
Norton v. Blackman, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983). The courts 
have been especially careful to make sure that issues attempted 
to be raised by the affidavit of an interested party are 
sufficient to carry the matter to trial. The long held test used 
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by the courts to review motions for summary judgment supported by 
affidavits is similar to that of a directed verdict: 
When a party presents evidence on which, taken by 
itselfr it would be entitled to a directed verdict if 
believed, and which the opposing party does not 
discredit as dishonest, it rests upon that party at 
least to specify some opposing evidence which it can 
adduce and which will change the result. 
Radio City Music Hall Corporation v. United States, 135 F.2d 715, 
718 (2nd Cir. 1943). See also Byner v. Mutual Life Insurance 
Company of New York, 217 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1954). ("If the 
testimony presented by the affidavits is such that a directed 
verdict would have to be granted, the Court is justified in 
granting summary judgment . . .") Finally, the courts have noted 
that where there is a conflict summary judgment is apprpriate 
where the "evidence on one or the hand is too incredible to be 
accepted by reasonable minds or is without legal probative force 
even if true . . . ." Dewev v. Clark, 180 F.2d 766, 772 (D.C. 
Cir. 1950). 
Important to the District Court's ruling on the defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment was the fact that the Court 
scrutinized the affidavits filed by the parties and on motion by 
the defendants struck three of DAC's "affidavits" as being 
improper under Rule 56(e). (R.p. 588). Two of them were not 
even signed by the purported affiant or notarized and amounted to 
nothing more than what Mr. Yurth hoped they would state. The 
third was Mr. Yurth's own affidavit stating that he thought the 
affiants in those two affidavits would state what he said they 
would state. The second affidavit filed by Mr. Yurth was replete 
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with arguments, suppositions, hearsay and generally was contrary 
to the mandate of Rule 56(e). The Court properly struck the 
specific inappropriate portions. Thereafter, the court in 
keeping with the above cited authority, pierced the pleadings and 
found that none of the alleged issues of fact loudly claimed by 
DAC were genuine. The Court noted that five clear conditions 
precedent had to be met before the defendants were obligated to 
perform under the agreement. The Court found that the plaintiff 
failed to meet any of the five grounds. The failure of any one 
of the five conditions precedent is sufficient. DAC contends 
that sufficient facts were disclosed in the pleadings and its 
affidavits to raise genuine issues of fact. A review of the 
conceded conditions precedent and the facts surrounding the 
failure of their performance reveals that the Court acted 
properly and prudently in determining that there were no 
"genuine" and "material" issues of fact. 
A. CLAIMS UNDER THE WRITTEN CONSTRUCTION AND LEASE 
AGREEMENT. 
The conditions precedent established in the Construction and 
Lease Agreement between the parties will be discussed 
chronologically first, with the claims under the oral agreement 
being discussed thereafter. 
The Required Temporary 
Rent was Not Paid. 
As noted, DAC was permitted temporary occupancy of office 
space on the second floor of the vacant Kress Building in 
exchange for token monthly rents. When the Construction and Lease 
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Agreement was signed, the temporary occupancy and rental 
requirements was memorialized in that agreement. It stated, 
"The parties hereby agree that effective with the date 
of execution of this agreement that the Lessee shall 
have the use of the premises for the sum of One Dollar 
and no/100 ($1,00) per month with the additional 
understanding that Lessee agrees to pay for his own 
utilities. At such time as the improvements described 
in paragraph 2 are substantially completed, the 
permanent term of this lease shall commence . . . . 
The $1.00 per month herein refers to the office space 
in the Kress Building. If Lessor leases this building, 
Lessee will be required to relocate." (Paragraph V A 
Construction and Lease Agreement; Appendix "A"). 
DAC made none of the required $1.00 rental payments as is clearly 
and unequivocally established in the deposition of Mr. Horman. 
(Horman deposition p. 186; R.p. 608). DAC's principal officer, 
David Yurth, contends that the $1.00 a month rental was paid 100 
months in advance and as evidence of that prepayment submitted to 
the Court a purported receipt for $100. Mr. Yurth's naked 
assertions that the rents were paid are not sufficient, however, 
to raise a "material" or "genuine" issue in the face of an 
unopposed affidavit of an experienced and expert document 
examiner that the purported "receipt" was a forgery. The receipt 
for the 100 months rent, which Mr. Yurth indicates is evidence of 
payment of the monthly rentals, was uncontrovertibly established 
as a forgery (see the affidavit of the handwriting expert, George 
J. Throckmorton, R.p. 34), and the documents from which it was 
forged were those found with DAC and its principal officer, Mr. 
David Yurth. (See affidavit of Stephen D. Peterson, R.p. 297) 
Although the rent is insignificant in amount, the failure of DAC 
to present any credible evidence whatever to overcome this 
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unopposed evidence of forgery places all of Mr. Yurth's 
statements in question. 
The Harver Building Could 
Not be Reinforced as Required. 
Another condition precedent to the defendants1 performance 
was that construction would be contingent upon whether "the 
Harver Building can be reinforced at a price that is acceptable 
to Lessor [defendants], and in a manner that will satisfy the 
requirements of the Salt Lake City Building Department.11 
(Paragraph III B, Construction and Lease Agreement; Appendix 
"A"). This condition precedent has two parts which must both be 
completed. First, the cost of reinforcing the building for the 
the intended use as an athletic club must be acceptable to the 
defendants. Second, the proposed reinforcement must satisfy the 
requirements of the Salt Lake City Building Department. 
Nowhere can DAC point to any piece of evidence that suggests 
that the defendants have ever found the proposed cost of 
reinforcement acceptable. While DAC makes the argument that the 
building could be reinforced in a manner to satisfy the 
requirements of the Salt Lake City Building Department (and 
perhaps we must concede that anything is possible), DAC has not 
and can not overcome the undisputed fact that after the lapse of 
four years from the 1981 Construction and Lease Agreement to the 
date of the hearing or the motion for summary judgment, Salt Lake 
City had never approved any proposed reinforcement scheme and no 
satisfactory reinforcement scheme had been presented to the City 
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(Affidavit of Assistant Director of the D€*partment of Buildingf 
Roger Evans, R.p. 290) 
Much of DAC's argument centers on engineering studies. This 
is understandable, because before the cost of reinforcement can 
be determined, and before it can be determined whether the 
building can be reinforced in a manner that will satisfy the 
requirements of the Salt Lake City Building Department, 
engineering studies must be completed. From these studies costs 
can be determined and the Building Department's approval sought. 
Initially, DAC retained Bonneville Engineering to do the 
engineering and seismic studies to determine whether the 
warehouse could be renovated and reinforced to comply with local 
building code requirements. (Yurth deposition, p. 138, R.p. 
607). Bonneville Engineering made extensive studies of the 
building and reached the preliminary finding that, to meet the 
building code requirements, either the existing building would 
have to be demolished and a new one constructed or the entire 
building—every beam, column, corner brace and floor area—would 
have to be reinforced, costing an estimated $150,000 per floor. 
This price was not acceptable
 m to the defendants, and this is 
admitted by Mr. Yurth. (Yurth deposition, pp. 147-148, R.p. 
607.) Bonneville Engineering did not prepare a written report of 
its finding for DAC but only presented these preliminary findings 
orally. (Yurth deposition, p. 148, R.p. 607). 
DAC was not satisfied with Bonneville Engineering's finding 
and determined to engage another engineering firm, Ronald Weber 
and Associates, to do follow-up structural analysis. (Yurth 
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deposition, p. 153, R.p. 607.) It is admitted that DAC never 
obtained a written report from Ronald Weber and Associates. 
(Yurth deposition, pp. 214, 215, R.p. 607). In the face of 
repeated requests in this case, both formally and informally, DAC 
has never provided the defendants with any engineering studies 
whatever from Ronald Weber and Associates. In fact, the 
plaintiff has conceded that it expected the result of the 
engineering studies to be that the Harver Warehouse is unusable 
for the purpose proposed and that, short of demolishing the 
building, it could not be renovated in an economically feasible 
fashion. (Yurth deposition, p. 194, R.p. 607). 
It is also uncontested that no final engineering reports, 
architectural drawings, etc. were ever submitted to the Salt Lake 
City Building Department. The affidavit of Roger Evans, 
Assistant Director of the Department of Building and Housing 
Services for Salt Lake City Corporation, shows that he has 
responsibility for determining whether plans and specifications 
meet the requirements of the building code and that 
"[n]either Mr. Yurth, the Downtown Athletic Club, Inc., 
nor anyone has ever submitted any plans, 
specifications, engineering reports or the requested 
seismic analysis, or any other documents which are 
necessary to undertake a review of the project by the 
Department. Accordingly, the City Building Department 
has never had and does not now have any basis on which 
to approve any building permits for the construction of 
the proposed health club facility." (R.p. 293-294). 
Since no engineering report has ever been provided to DAC, to the 
defendants, or to the City which would indicate that the Harver 
Warehouse could be economically reinforced to meet the City 
building code requirements, this clear condition precedent was 
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not met and DAC has breached a material condition of the 
Construction and Lease Agreement. 
DAC attempts to rebut these established facts by reference 
in its brief to certain pages from Mr. Yurth*s deposition wherein 
Mr. Yurth discusses his suspicions concerning the preparation of 
engineering reports which were not as DAC hoped. It should be 
noted from those paragraphs/ however, that there is nothing cited 
to indicate that in fact any engineering reports were actually 
prepared. All that is alluded to by DAC is the already well 
established fact that only oral reports of the engineering and 
price studies had been received by DAC. 
The affidavit of Scott Evans which allegedly outlines the 
engineering work relied on by DAC does not even call into 
question the establisheded facts. Mr. Evans' affidavit reveals 
that the engineering work, a written report of which was never 
seen by DAC (Yurth deposition p. 194; R.p. 607) and drawings he 
prepared Hconstituted the basis for the preliminary concept 
approval for the building permits by the City." (R.p* 476). Mr. 
Evans also describes a meeting with Roger Evans regarding a 
proposed or preliminary plan to accomplish the necessary 
renovations. (R.p. 475-476). He does not assert that anything 
was ever submitted for approval to the City or that final 
engineering and price studies were ever presented to defendants 
that indicated the building could be renovated at an acceptable 
price. 
DAC has presented nothing that contravenes the affidavit of 
the Assistant Director of Building and Housing Services for Salt 
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Lake City Corporation and has presented nothing to raise any 
question that defendants have ever found even any proposed cost 
of reinforcement acceptable. 
Thus, neither part of the two-part requirement of this 
condition precedent was fulfilled. 
No Financing Acceptable to 
Lessor was Provided. 
The agreement was specifically conditioned upon lessee 
(defendants) receiving and accepting financing "acceptable to 
lessor" with interest rates not in excess of 12%. 
Paragraph 4 of the Construction and Lease Agreement provided 
that: 
"Lessor [defendants] agrees that the construction of 
the improvements . . . shall be commenced not later 
than seven days following confirmed receipt and 
acceptance by Lessor [defendants] of construction 
financing acceptable to Lessor [defendants] at the 
offices of the lender of Lessor's [defendant's] choice 
and shall be completed within twelve months 
thereafter." (Appendix "A"). 
In paragraph VI of the Construction and Lease Agreement, 
subparagraph (f) it provides that: 
"This lease is subject to Lessor [defendants] being 
able to secure sufficient financing . . . at a rate not 
to exceed twelve percent' [12%] per annum and that 
Lessee [DAC] shall pay all annual interest charges in 
excess of twelve percent [12%] per annum, provided that 
if the Lessor [defendants] does decide to pay a higher 
interest rate than twelve percent (12%), the annual 
interest rate is acceptable to the Lessee [DAC]." 
(Appendix "A"). 
Thus the acquisition and approval of financing acceptable to 
the defendants was a condition precedent to construction. The 
loan to be received and approved by the defendants was not to 
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exceed twelve percent per annum unless defendants decided to 
accept and approve a higher rate, and then DAC was required to 
pay all excess interest above 12% if it decided to accept the 
higher interest rate. Subparagraph (f) of paragraph VI of the 
Construction and Lease Agreement makes it clear that it is the 
defendants' option whether to accept financing at a rate greater 
than twelve percent, i.e., if the defendants are willing to 
accept the risk of greater interest charges. DAC can not force 
the defendants to accept financing above the 12% range, but if 
the defendants chose to accept an interest rate greater than 12%r 
DAC would then have to approve that rate since it would have to 
pay the added cost. Thusf it is clear under this provision that 
the defendants could reject any and all financing which had an 
annual interest rate greater than 12%. 
As established in both the depositions of Mr. Horman and Mr. 
Yurth, efforts, were made by the defendants to secure financing 
which would conform to the requirements of the Construction and 
Lease Agreement. (Horman depositionr pp. 60-66; 74-75r R.p. 608; 
and Yurth deposition pp. 179, 180, R.p. 607), but defendants were 
unable to find any financing. (Horman deposition pp. 74-74, R.p. 
608). DAC, as a prospective lessee, also attempted to provide 
construction and take out financing. After considerable and 
extensive efforts on its part, it also was unable to provide 
suitable financing. (Yurth deposition, pp. 207, 224, 227, 229, 
232, 233, 235, 239, 240, 247, 254, 256, 262, 265, 275, R.p. 607). 
At no time in its extensive search for financing was DAC able to 
provide both adequate construction financing and suitable take-
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out financing which would meet the requirements of the terms of 
the Construction and Lease Agreement. Thus this condition 
precedent was never fulfilled. 
In an effort to raise an issue that does not exist, DAC 
relied in the District Court on a supposed commitment which it 
claims is in a letter written by one Maurice Green on the 
letterhead of Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Company. A 
reading of that letter, (Exhibit 33 to Yurth Deposition, R.p. 
607), shows that it is clearly not a commitment of any kind, 
certainly is not a commitment of Transamerica, but is nothing 
more than Mr. Green's unsubstantiated assertion that he could get 
financing. This is the Mr. Green who supposedly would testify as 
set forth in the unsigned purported affidavit submitted by DAC 
under his name through whom DAC claims it paid to Transamerica a 
commitment fee of $7,500. In support of the motion for summary 
judgment, defendants submitted the affidavit of Mr. Sherman 
Gillman, the investment officer of Transamerica Occidental Life 
Insurance Company, which establishes that Mr. Green was nothing 
more than a life insurance salesman, was not a loan officer of 
Transamerica, had no authority to loan or commit funds on behalf 
of Transamerica, that the letters relied on by DAC were not 
mailed with knowledge or authority of Transamerica, that not only 
did Transamerica never make any commitment to loan funds or 
obtain another source of financing for DAC, but Transamerica 
never even received a loan application from DAC and has not 
received any commitment fee of $7,500 or any other amount from 
DAC. (R.p. 319-321). In the face of this affidavit filed with 
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the motion over four months before the hearing, DAC is unable to 
come up with any contrary statement from the now elusive Mr. 
Green from whom DAC obtained, apparently with easer the letters 
relied upon. DAC's strained effort to refute this does notf to 
say the least, create a "genuine" issue of material fact. 
DAC's only other effort to avoid the unquestioned and 
dispositive failure to meet the conditions precedent does not 
present an issue of fact which would defeat the summary judgment 
but rather quibbles about the meaning of the contract provision. 
The contract provisions are clear and are questions of law, not 
fact, to be resolved by the courts. 
Like the other conditions precedent, this one failure alone 
is sufficient to sustain the District Court's entry of summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants. 
No Assignment of Dues 
Income was Made to a 
Special Account for Payment 
of the Monthly Leasing Expenses. 
The Construction and Lease Agreement provides that: 
"In addition, it is agreed and understood that Lessor 
[defendants] shall construct the improvements called 
for in this lease with the understanding that Lessee 
[DAC] shall sell a sufficient number of memberships 
prior to beginning construction of the Athletic Club to 
guarantee that the payments required by this contract 
will be paid; Lessee [DAC] agrees to assign dues income 
in a sufficient amount to guarantee said payments 
according to individual membership contracts by 
contract number to a special account designated solely 
for the payment of monthly lease payments due and 
payable under the terms of this lease. These contracts 
must be acceptable to Lessor [defendants] and the 
mortgage loan company." (Appendix "A", paragraph IV). 
Because defendant was concerned about DAC's ability to make 
payment it was required that DAC establish that enough 
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memberships had been sold and that dues payable under those 
contracts would be sufficient to meet DAC's obligations. Thus, 
two conditions precedent were created — DAC must sell sufficient 
memberships to guarantee required payments and there must be an 
assignment of sufficient dues income to cover those payments. 
Both of these conditions precedent were unfulfilled. There 
was never any indication that a sufficient number of memberships 
were sold by DAC as required, andDAC has to date never provided 
proof of the sale of those memberships. Also DAC admits that no 
"special account designated solely for the payment of monthly 
lease payments due and payable under this Lease" was ever 
established. (Yurth deposition, pp. 82-86; R.p. 607). 
Furthermore, the Construction and Lease Agreement required that 
dues income be assigned to the "special account" by specific 
membership contract number. Although Mr. Yurth has provided a 
supposed account at the Citizens Bank, that account in no way 
satisfies this contractual requirement. (Yurth deposition, pp. 
82-86, R.p. 607). Moreover, whatever bank accounts the plaintiff 
did maintain, there was never any attempt to establish a 
procedure to assign dues income by specific contract number to 
those accounts or to preserve the accounts as required by the 
agreement. 
DAC asserts that a question of fact exists on this issue yet 
makes no reference to any fact in the record or elsewhere. Since 
there is nothing in the record to rebut the failure of this 
condition precedent, DAC raises for the first time in this appeal 
the issues of waiver and estoppel and off-handedly asserts that 
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defendants be estopped to deny the nonperformance of the 
condition precedent or that they have waived this requirement. 
These issues were never pled nor raised before the District 
Court either by oral agreement or written memorandum. Where an 
issue is raised for the first time on appeal and was not argued 
before the District Court this Court has declined to address the 
merits of the argument. Smith v. Vuicich, 8 UAR 5 (Utah 1985) 
citing Almon, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission. slip. op. 
18637, filed February 7, 1985? Bundv v. Century Equipment 
Company, Inc., slip, op., 18270, filed November 2, 1984. 
Regardless of its failure to properly raise these issues, DAC's 
mere assertion of an estoppel or waiver are insufficient to raise 
a question of fact where it has provided nothing upon which to 
base its arguments. DAC has offered nothing by way of affidavits 
or otherwise to establish facts that would justify a claim of 
estoppel or of waiver. Where DAC has failed to provide the 
necessary factual basis for its legal assertions they do not 
raise any questions of fact which would require the setting aside 
of the summary judgment. 
None of these conditions precedent have been fulfilled, 
and the record before the Court stands undisputed. The District 
Court found that DAC did not raise any genuine issues of fact 
regarding the failure to fulfill these conditions precedent and 
properly entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 
The failure of any one of the conditions precedent will justify 
the District Court's ruling and in this appeal DAC has not 
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succeeded in raising a question about the fulfillment of any one 
of the conditions precedent. 
B. THE ALLEGED ORAL AGREEMENT TO ASSIGN. 
In its complaint, DAC alleges the breach of two 
separate, alternative agreements. The first is a breach of the 
written Construction and Lease Agreement, and the second is an 
alleged oral agreement to assign a part of the Harver Warehouse 
master lease to DAC. In its written memorandum in the District 
Court, DAC, with new counsel on the scene, for the first time in 
an attempt to "clarify" the nature of its claim, shifted and 
contended that, rather than superseding the original Construction 
and Lease Agreement and creating a new agreement, the alleged 
oral agreement to assign was actually an oral modification of the 
prior agreement. Regardless of whether the alleged oral 
agreement worked as an oral modification or superseded the prior 
agreement, the oral agreement was void under the Statute of 
Frauds and was subject to several clear conditions precedent that 
were not met. 
1. THE ORAL AGREEMENT IS VOID UNDER THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS. 
The application of the Statute of Frauds to an 
alleged oral agreement is a question of law proper for resolution 
in a motion for summary judgment. The Utah Statute of Frauds 
applies to the transaction at issue here, since it deals with the 
creation, granting, assignment or surrendering of an estate or 
interest in real property. U.C.A. 25-5-1. The Statute of Frauds 
requires that any agreement which falls within its parameters 
--37-
must be in writingf with a clear statement of the essential terms 
and conditions/ and the writing must be signed by the party being 
charged. Greoerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369f 374 (Utah 1980); 
Peterson v. Hendricks, 524 P.2d 321 (Utah 1974); Birdzell v. Utah 
Oil Refining Co., 121 Utah 412f 242 P.2d 578 (1952). 
Where the original agreement is within the Statute of 
Frauds/ any subsequent agreement which alters/ modifies/ or 
amends it must also satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Strevell-
Paterson Co., Inc. v. Francis, 640 P.2d 741/ 742 (Utah 1982); 
Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P. 2d 1319/ 1322 (Utah 1975); 
Combined Metals, Inc. v. Bastian, 71 Utah 535/ 569/ 267 P.2d 
1020/ 1032 (1928). 
It is elementary that when a contract is required to be 
in writing/ the same requirement applies with equal force to 
any alteration or modification thereof. More importantly 
herer any such modifying agreement must be sufficiently 
certain and unequivocal in its terms that the parties will 
understand what it is and what is to be done under it. 
Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, supra. DAC has produced no 
written memorandum of the terms of the modification whatsoever. 
Furthermore/ there is no signature of the defendant which would 
give any authenticity to those alleged terms. 
DAC attempted to rely on the doctrine of part performance to 
salvage the oral modification from the bar of the Statute of 
Frauds. In order to effectively rescue the oral modification 
from the bar of the Statute of Frauds by use of the doctrine of 
part performance and to assert liability against the defendants, 
the plaintiff has several stumbling blocks which must be 
overcome. First/ the acts of part performance relied upon to 
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remove the alleged oral modification from the statute of frauds 
must be exclusively referrable to the oral modification and not 
to any other obligation. Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 534 
P.2d 611, 614 (Utah 1975). Where the acts relied on as part 
performance relate to any other agreement, they cannot support a 
claim of part performance. Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 
supra. 
In McDonald v. Barton Bros. Investment Corp., 631 P.2d 851, 
853 (Utah 1981), this Court wrote: 
The controlling issue on this appeal is . . . 
whether the alleged acts of part performance were 
themselves referrable and done in pursuance of that 
contract. If the acts relied on were not done in the 
execution of the oral contract but can be explained on 
other grounds, they are insufficient to remove the bar 
of the Statute of Frauds, and the contract is 
unenforceable. [Citation omitted.] 
As explained, in In re: Roth Estate, 2 Utah 2d 40, 44, 269 P.2d 
278, 281 (1954), the reason for this requirement is that "the 
equitable doctrine of part performance is based on estoppel, and 
unless the acts of part performance are exclusively referrable to 
the contract, there is nothing to show that the plaintiff relied 
on it or changed his position to his prejudice, so as to give 
rise to an estoppel." Similarly, in Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 
P.2d 74, 79 (Utah 1982), this Court declined to apply the part 
performance doctrine because "there was an explanation for the 
purchase of the adjoining property other than the oral contract 
to sell." Ravarino v. Price, 260 P.2d 570 (Utah 1953), cautions 
that "[t]he doctrine is to be applied with great care, paying 
attention to the policy expressed in the Statute of Frauds and 
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historical precedent where the limits have been defined by the 
process of inclusion and exclusion." In Price v. Lloyd. 31 Utah 
86, 86 P. 767, 772 (1906), this Court stated: 
Courts of equity, in establishing the doctrine 
invoked by the plaintiff, have not, by any means, 
intended to annul the Statute of Frauds, but only to 
prevent its being made the means of perpetrating a 
fraud. In order that a plaintiff may be permitted to 
give evidence of a contract not in writing, and which 
is in the very teeth of the statute and a nullity at 
law, it is essential that he establish, by clear and 
'positive proof, acts and things done in pursuance and 
on account thereof, exclusively referrable thereto, and 
which take it out of the operation of the Statute. 
DAC has not alleged any acts of part performance relating 
exclusively to the oral modification which would work to protect 
it from the bar of the Statute of Frauds. All of the acts 
alleged, including the engineering studies and the financing, are 
requirements of the original Construction and Lease Agreement and 
do not relate exclusively to the alleged oral modification. 
2. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO THE ALLEGED ORAL AGREEMENT 
HAVE NOT BEEN MET. 
If the discussions between Mr. Yurth and Mr. Horman could in 
any way be construed as amounting to an oral agreement to assign 
or to modify, that agreement's purpose would have been to effect 
a transfer of property subject to the Construction and Lease 
Agreement. There has never been any dispute that even the 
alleged oral agreement was conditioned on nearly all of the 
conditions precedent to the written agreement. (R.p. 367-8). 
DAC does not attempt to refute that these conditions precedent 
exist but only contends that those conditions were fulfilled. 
See Appellate Brief p. 15. Those conditions precedent are: 
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Firstr DAC agreed to provide complete and acceptable engineering 
reports to the City and to get the City's approval of the 
renovation project, (R.p. 367, paragraph (2)1.)- Second, DAC 
acknowledged that under its theory of the purported agreementf it 
would provide suitable construction and long term financing. 
(R.p. 368, paragraph (2)2.). Third, it was agreed by DAC that 
prior to any assignment, there would be an absolute and 
irrevocable release of S.M. Horman & Sons Co. from the Harver 
master lease. (R.p. 367, paragraph (1)4.). 
No Engineering Reports 
Were Submitted and 
Approved by the City* 
DAC recognized that just as with the written agreement a 
prerequisite to any conveyance of any portion of the Harver 
lease, by assignment or otherwise, was the completion of 
engineering studies be complete and a viable plan for the 
reinforcement or the renovation of the warehouse be approved. 
(Yurth Deposition pp. 192, 196, 200? R.p. 607, R.p. 367). 
As discussed earlier at p. 27 to p. 31 engineering reports 
and cost estimates were never provided by any of the alleged 
engineering firms who were retained to do those studies. Of 
great importance, however, was the fact nothing was ever 
submitted to the Salt Lake City Department of Building and 
Housing Services for approval. (See affidavit of Roger Evans, 
R.p. 290, 296). The failure of DAC to provide complete 
engineering studies to the City is significant, because without 
the City's approval andproper permits issued renovation would be 
impossible. 
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No Suitable Financing 
Was Ever Provided. 
Just as with the written agreement, it was a condition 
precedent under the alleged oral agreement to the granting of any 
interest in the Harver lease by defendants that DAC would provide 
suitable construction and long-term financing. (Yurth Deposition 
pp. 192, 196, and 200; R.p. 607; "Minutes of the Executive 
Committee Meeting" for September 23, 1981. (R.p. 367). DAC was 
unable to provide adequate construction or long-term financing at 
any time (See discussion above at p. 31 to 34). Because DAC has 
failed to rebut the factual assertions made by the defendants and 
because no issues of fact were raised, the District Court's entry 
of summary judgment was proper. 
An Absolute Assignment 
And Release was Not Provided. 
One final condition precedent of tremendous importance to 
defendants was the requirement that defendants be completely 
released from the Harver lease as part of any assignment and DAC 
be substituted as lessee. For example, "Minutes" of DAC reveal 
that it knew of the importance of this condition precedent. 
The possibility that DAC may at some further time 
become insolvent and therefore unable to meet its lease 
and mortgage payments will require that the owner of 
the property agree to an absolute and irrevocable 
assignment of the master lease so that Mr. Horman et. 
al. will have no further exposure to obligations 
requiring future payments. (R.p. 367) 
Mr. Brent Dyer, a participant brought by DAC into the 
discussions between DAC and defendants, (Yurth deposition, p. 
202, R.p. 607), in his affidavit confirmed the fact that a 
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complete and absolute release was a prerequisite to any 
assignment of the Harver lease (R. p. 285-289). 
DAC concedes that no release could be obtained, which makes 
the failure of this requirement uncontrovertable. (Yurth 
deposition p. 11 of corrections to deposition, R.p. 607). Since 
this failure of this condition precedent is uncontrovertablef DAC 
has made an unfounded attempt to change the nature of the 
condition precedent. DAC has attempted to change the absolute 
and complete release from the lease to one which requires only 
indemnification — a drastically different condition. In support 
of its contention that only indemnification was required DAC 
offered Mr. Yurth's deposition and an affidavit of Mr. Richard 
Clissold. From a brief review of both references, however, it is 
evident that neither raise any issues of fact concerning either 
the nature of requirement or the fact that it was unfulfilled. 
In his deposition, Mr. Yurth affirmed and reaffirmed that it 
was DAC's clear understanding that defendants must receive a 
complete and irrevocable release from the master lease as a 
condition precedent to any proposed assignment. (Yurth 
deposition, p. 211, 313, R.p," 607). Mr. Yurth subsequently 
altered his deposition transcript by filing 14 pages of 
"clarifications of the testimony." These "clarifications" 
consist of substantial modification of his testimony with regard 
to his previous description of meetings in which the alleged oral 
agreement to assign were dicussed and the conditions precedent 
were articulated. Where originally his deposition testimony was 
in agreement with contemporaneous corporate minutes, his 
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"clarifications" were artfully drawn to avoid the impact of the 
prior record. These "clarifications/1 and Mr. Yurth's efforts to 
blunt the effect of the clear admissions made at the taking of 
his deposition must be cautiously analyzed as the District Court 
obviously did. Furthermoref these "clarification" showed the 
inherent unreliability of his testimony and this coupled with the 
unopposed affidavit of the handwriting expert showing submission 
by DAC of a forged document to the Court makes Mr. Yurth's 
testimony inherently unreliable. These methods make plaintiff's 
entire argument suspect, [cf. Webster v. Still, 675 P.2d 1170 
(Utah 1983); Dewey v. Clark, supra.1, and certainly canot be said 
to raise a "genuine issue of fact." 
Mr. Clissold's affidavit offers nothing but his opinion 
concerning his "understanding" of the terms of the alleged 
agreement to assign, (R.p. 496), and can not serve to overcome. 
Such an affidavit is insufficient to raise a question of fact. 
Webster v. Still, supra, at 1172. 
Under these circumstances, where DAC has done nothing to 
rebut the factual assertions made by defendants and where no 
questions of fact have been raised by DAC as to its compliance 
with the conditions precedent, the District Court's entry of 
summary judgment should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
In this appeal DAC has presented nothing which would merit 
reversal of the District Court's summary judgment. Proper and 
sound discretion was exercised in denying DAC's untimely request 
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to further depose a party previously deposed. No reasons 
whatever were given for the requested discovery, and there was no 
showing that the proposed discovery was directed to any issues 
material to the motion for summary judgment. 
DACfs brief monotonously reiterates that questions of fact 
were raised but does not provide any meaningful citation to any 
fact established by appropriate affidavit, or deposition, or 
document which would establish a genuine issue as to any material 
fact. It is established by unrebutted affidavits, depositions, 
the plaintiffs1 own documents, and by admissions of DAC's chief 
officer that both the written and oral agreements relied upon by 
plaintiffs were premised on the conditions precedent and that 
those conditions remain to this day totally unperformed. The 
alleged oral agreement, taking DAC's argument at its best, 
remains simply an alleged oral agreement without the writing 
required by the Statute of Frauds. 
During the course of four years, DAC was unable to perform 
as it agreed in the agreements which form the basis of its suit. 
In an effort to avoid the consequence of this failure, it has 
filed a complaint that is without substance, presented to the 
court a forged document, substantially "corrected" damaging 
deposition testimony, and presented unsigned and unsworn 
affidavits and affidavits clearly contrary to the requirements of 
Rule 56(e). Even those responses to the motion for summary 
judgment were untimely, and the frenetic effort of DAC to avoid 
the summary judgment simply further confirms the frivolous nature 
of the case it had filed. This is precisely the type of 
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complaint that Rule 56 is designed to dispose of. The summary 
judgment should be affirmed* 
DATED this /J day of July, 1985. 
FOX, EDWARDS, JGARDINER & BROWN 
iner, Jr. t L/Gafd 
David B. Thomas 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Respondent 
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APPENDIX "AM 
CONSTRUCTION AND LEASE AGREEMENT FOR THE DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB 
This Agreement executed by and between S, M. HORMAN AND 
SONS, a partnership, hereinafter referred to as "Lessor," and 
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., a Utah corporation, hereinafter 
referred to as "Lessee." 
I Premises. The premises included in this Agreement are 
part of the Harver Warehouse Building and/or part of the Kress 
Building and/or part of the Grant Building, located in downtown 
Salt Lake City, Utah, as more particularly described and shown on 
Exhibit A, which is a property description of the building(s) to 
be used. In the event that any or all of said buildings are 
demolished, the premises shall be located in the new buildings 
built upon the same locations where the referenced buildings are 
presently located. 
II Occupancy. It is the intent of the parties to this 
Agreement that Lessee shall have occupancy of the portions of the 
"premises" as more particularly described as follows: 
A. Harver Warehouse 
III 
expense 
premises 
B, 
Building—The basement location, 
cond floor and roof level of the 
Building location, as more par-
ground level, se  
Harver Warehouse 
ticularly described and shown on the floor plans 
attached hereto as Exhibits A(1) through A(5) f^^ca ^ ^ 
V/^j^/ 
plans attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
Construction.~ Lessor 
to make the following 
as follows: 
agrees at its 
improvements to 
sole 
the 
cost and 
described 
A. Harver Warehouse Building—Lessor shall install 
all permanent improvements for the basement level, 
ground level, second floor, new third floor, and 
new roof level of the Harver Warehouse Building 
location including heating, ventilation, air 
conditioning, electrical systems, plumbing, 
sprinkling systems, fire systems, stairways and 
walkways, lighting, interior and party walls, 
decking, and all engineering, architectural and 
structural work related thereto sufficiently to 
cause the premises to house the facilities shown 
in the floor plan as more particularly described 
and shown as floor plans on Exhibits A(1) through 
(H), provided that the Harver Building can be 
reinforced at a price that is acceptable to Lessor 
and Lessee, and in a manner which will satisfy the 
requirements of the Salt Lake City Building De-
partment, All costs of remodeling and construc-
tion shall be borne by Lessor provided, however, 
that Lessee shall provide its own leasehold im-
provements and furnishings on said premises. 
Lessor and Lessee agree and Lessor understands 
that Lessee's leasehold improvements shall be 
considered by the Lessor and Lessee to specific-
ally include, be defined and shall further be 
considered as the Lessee's personal property, all 
furnishings, removable fixtures, appliances, 
removable equipment and machinery as more par-
ticularly described and shown on Exhibit C. 
B. Grant Building—Lessor shall install all permanent 
improvements for the main level of the Grant 
Building including heating, ventilation, air 
conditioning, electrical systems, plumbing, 
sprinkling systems, fire systems, stairways and 
walkways, lighting, interior and party walls, 
decking, and all engineering, architectural and 
structural work related thereto sufficiently to 
cause the premises to house the facilities shown 
in the floor plan as more particularly described 
and shown on Exhibits BCD and (2), provided that 
the Grant Building can be remodeled at a price 
that is acceptable to both Lessor and Lessee, and 
in a manner which will satisfy the requirements of 
the Salt Lake City Building Department, All costs 
of remodeling and construction shall be borne by 
Lessor provided, however, that Lessee shall pro-
vide its own leasehold improvements and furnish-
ings on said premises. Lessor and Lessee agree 
and Lessor understands that Lessee's leasehold 
improvements shall be considered by the Lessor and 
Lessee to specifically include, be defined and 
shall further be considered as the Lessee's per-
sonal property, furnishings, removable fixtures, 
appliances, removable equipment and machinery as 
more particularly described and shown on Exhibit 
D, 
In addition, the Lessor and Lessee understand and agree that the 
Lessor may modify, change or alter the design specifications 
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\ 
contained in the floor plans as more particularly described and 
shown on Exhibits A(1) and (2) f B(1) and (2), C and D as required 
by applicable governmental and regulatory agencies 
obtain building permits and the final certificate 
for the project. 
sufficient to 
of completion 
IV 
the 
Performance. Lessor agrees that the construction of 
improvements described above and as more particularly de-
scribed and shown on Exhibits A and B shall be commenced not 
later than seven days following confirmed receipt and acceptance 
y Lessor of construction financing acceptable to L 
ffices of the lender of Lessor's choice, and shall 
i i. I~ i ~ « ^ _ ~ - 4. U ~ 4.1 . /»«.
 A M T/» 4. U ~ ~ ~ « U «• 1 1 U ~ ~ 
b
o 
within 12 months 
construction or 
n^. ' dues 
Lessor at the 
be completed 
thereafter. If there shall be a delay in the 
repair of any improvements caused by strikes, 
riots, acts of God, shortages of labor or materials, national 
emergency, governmental restrictions, laws or regulations or any 
other cause or causes beyond either party's control, such delay 
shall not be a violation of this Lease and the time periods set 
forth in this Lease for any such work shall at such party's 
option be extended for a period of time equal to the period of 
delay. Anything to the contrary herein contained notwithstand-
ing, the design and construction of the store front for the 
premises shall be at Lessor's sole cost and expense. In addi-
tion, it is agreed and understood that Lessor shall construct the 
improvements called for in this Le~-~ «««•* +*- ..^--••. *~^ < «~ 
Lessee sh_all sell a sufficient 
ic Club to guarantee that the payments 
t will be paid; Lessee agrees to assign 
— ... - sufficient amount to guarantee said payments 
according to individual membership contracts 
t o -' * - - - - • • • 
•ompletio rT"fc f the Athlet 
equired By this contrac 
.ase with the understanding that 
number of membershipsp"prior to 
income in a
contract dccoraing to inaiviaual raemoersnip contracts oy contract numoer 
to a special account designated solely for the payment of monthly 
lease payments due and payable under the terms of this Lease. 
These contracts must be acceptable to Lessor and the mortgage 
loan company. 
V Lease Term. The term of the Lease shall be as follows: 
* 
A. Original Term--The parties hereby agree that 
effective with the date of execution of this 
Agreement that the Lessee shall have the use of 
the Premises for the sum of ONE DOLLAR AND NO/100 
($1.00) per month with the additional understand-
ing that Lessee agrees to pay for his own utili-
ties. At such time as the improvements described 
in paragraph two are substantially completed, the 
permanent term of this Lease shall commence. The 
permanent terra shall be for a period of 15 years 
commencing after Lessor and Lessee agree improve-
ments to the building are substantially complete, 
and the premises can be occupied by Lessor and 
open to the public for business. The Lease shall 
end on the last day of the 15th year. The $1.00 
per month herein refers to the office space in the 
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Kress Building. If Lessor leases this building, 
Lessee will be required to relocate. 
B. Option to Renew—If the Lessee desires to continue 
to occupy the premises for an additional period, 
the Lessee shall have successive one year renewal 
terms after giving notice to the Lessor, prior to 
the expiration of the original term of each prior 
renewal period. Upon such action, the Lessee 
shall have a renewal of said Lease for an addi-
tional one year period at a rate acceptable to 
Lessor. 
VI Lease Payments. Lease payments for the premises and 
improvements described in this Agreement shall be equivalent to 
the sum of the following three elements computed and payable on a 
monthly basis: 
A. The portion of the monthly amortization of the 
permanent financing attributed to interest over 
the initial 15 year lease period referred to 
herein; plus 
B. The portion of the monthly amortization of the 
permanent financing attributed to the principal 
sum required in construction of this job, includ-
ing the prorated amount of land cost, computed as 
the declining balance over the initial 15 year 
lease period; plus 
C. The monthly charge of $0,085 ($1.00 per year) per 
square foot of the leased premises based upon a 
total square footage of approximately 64,640 
square feet. In addition to the above monthly 
payments. Lessee shall pay to the Lessor a total 
of $64,000.00 per year payable monthly at 
$5«333.33 to represent the amount of rent Lessor 
is required to pay to the owner of the Harver 
Warehouse Building. In addition to this 
$64,000.00, the Lessee will be required to pay an 
increase added to this sum of $9,000.00 per year 
making a total of $73,000.00 each year during the 
second five-year period of this lease, payable 
monthly, and during the third five-year period of 
this Lease, this amount will increase to 
$82,000.00 per year, payable in equal monthly 
payments. It is further agreed that the minimum 
rent will be no less than $36,000.00 per month 
during the first year and this amount will in-
crease thereafter as herein described. 
D. Cost of Living Index Annual Computation—In addi-
tion to the above rent described in Items A and B 
herein. Lessee will be required to increase the 
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rent described in this Lease equal to any increase 
in the cost of living index. However, this in-
crease will not exceed the sum of eight percent 
(8%) per year even though the increase in the cost 
of living index may exceed that amount. 
E. Security Deposit — The Lessee shall remit to Lessor 
the sum of $20,000 within 10 days after commence-
ment of construction; the sum of $20,000 within 2 
days after construction is certified to be 50% 
complete, and the sum of $30,000 on or before 
Lessee shall occupy the improved space as speci-
fied above. 
F. Acquisition of Sufficient Financing—This Lease is 
subject to Lessor being able to secure sufficient 
financing to rebuild or remodel as the case may be 
the premises to be occupied under the terms of 
this Lease at a rate not to exceed 12% (12 per-
cent) per annum, and that Lessee shall pay all 
annual interest charges in excess of 12% (12 
percent) per annum, provided that if the Lessor 
does decide to pay a higher interest rate than 
twelve percent (12%), the annual interest rate is 
acceptable to the Lessee. 
VII Use of Premises. The premises shall be used and occu-
pied by the Lessee for the purpose of operating an athletic club, 
including all uses associated therewith, including but not limi-
ted to physical exercise, training and conditioning facilities, 
restaurants, snack bars, club facilities, and such other uses as 
may be reasonably associated therewith. Lessee shall occupy and 
use the premises for this purpose only and no other. Lessee 
shall not make or permit any use of the premises which shall 
constitute a nuisance or which shall cause offensive odors, 
sounds or appearances or which, directly or indirectly, is for-
bidden by public law, ordinance or governmental or municipal 
regulation or order. Lessee shall at its expense be entitled to 
place decorations or other improvements inside the premises and 
shall furnish and maintain the same in a good and attractive 
condition, at Lessee's expense and risk. It is understood and 
agreed that this is a "triple net" Lease in which the Lessee 
agrees to assume full responsibility for the payment of all taxes 
(particularly including but not limited to property taxes), 
insurance and maintenance of the Harver Building, or for any 
other improvements located in any other building occupied by 
Lessee. Lessee shall occupy and use the premises in a lawful 
manner complying with all laws and ordinances of the State of 
Utah, the City of Salt Lake, the county of Salt Lake, and all 
rules and regulations of the Board of Fire Underwriters for Salt 
Lake City, State of Utah. 
VIII Parking. The Lessor shall provide parking on a first-
come, first served basis to accommodate the customers of the 
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Lessee with respect to the premises described in this Agreement. 
Lessor agrees to provide access to the Harver Parking Terrace for 
the members, customers and guests of the Downtown Athletic Club 
on the same basis as other tenants of the Kress Building, Grant 
Building, and other adjoining buildings to the premises described 
in this Agreement. 
IX Utilities. The Lessor shall until substantial com-
pletion of construction and remodeling of the premises pay all 
utilities within and upon the premises and thereafter Lessee 
shall be responsible for and shall promptly pay all charges for 
use or consumption of separately metered heat, sewer, water, gas, 
electricity or any other utility services from the date of com-
mencement of the lease term, with the understanding that Lessor 
shall make provisions to separately meter water, gas, electricity 
and other utility services consumed by Lessee. 
X Indemnification. The Lessee shall indemnify Lessor and 
save it harmless from suits, actions, damages, liability and 
expense in connection with loss of life, bodily or personal 
injury or property damage arising from or out of the use or 
occupancy of the premises or any part thereof, or occasioned 
wholly or in part by any act or omission of Lessee, its agents, 
contractors, employees, servants, invitees, licensees or con-
cessionaires, whether occurring in or about the leased premises 
but excluding the common areas and facilities or elsewhere within 
the premises. Lessee shall not be liable for damage or injury 
proximately caused by the negligence of Lessor or its agents, 
servants or employees. This obligation to indemnify shall in-
clude reasonable attorneys fees and investigation costs and all 
other reasonable costs, expenses and liabilities from the first 
notice that any claim or demand is to be made or may be made. 
Lessor shall not be responsible or liable to Lessee or to those 
claiming by. through or under Lessee, except in the event of 
negligence for any loss or damage to either the persons or prop-
erty of Lessee that may be occasioned by or through the acts or 
omissions of persons occupying adjacent, connecting or otherwise 
adjoining premises. Lessee "shall be responsible for any defect, 
latent or otherwise, in any of the equipment, machinery, utili-
ties, appliances or apparatus in the building and shall be re-
sponsible and liable for any injury, loss or damage to any person 
or to any property of Lessee or other person caused by or result-
ing from bursting, breakage, or by or from leakage, or failure of 
fire sprinklers. Lessor shall not be responsible or liable for 
any loss or damage to either the persons or property of Lessee 
which may be caused by leakage of steam or snow or ice. running, 
backing up. seepage or the overflow of water or sewerage in any 
part of said premises, or for any injury or damage caused by or 
resulting from acts of God or the elements, or for any injury or 
damage caused by or resulting from any of said premises, the 
building, machinery, apparatus or equipment by any person or by 
or from the acts or negligence of any other occupant of the 
premises. Lessee shall give prompt notice to the Lessor in case 
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of fire or accidents in the premises or in the building or of 
defects therein or in any fixtures or equipment. 
XI
 Hlil£L_£l—§—Ii>l£ii£Il • T h e Lessor and the Lessee 
hereby waive any rights each may have against the other on ac-
count of any loss or damage occasioned to the Lessor or the 
Lessee, as the case may be, their respective property, the prem 7 
ises, or its contents, or to other portions of the premises, 
arising from any risk generally covered by fire and extended 
coverage insurance; and the parties, each on behalf of their 
respective insurance companies, insuring the property of either 
the Lessor or the Lessee, against any such loss, waive any right 
of subrogation that it may have against the Lessor or the Lessee, 
as the case may be. 
XII Lessee*s Insurance. The Lessee further covenants and 
agrees that, from and after the earlier of the commencement date 
of the term hereof or the commencement of any business by the 
Lessee in the premises, it will carry and maintain, at its sole 
cost and expense, the following types of insurance in the amounts 
specified and in the form hereinafter provided for: Bodily 
injury liability insurance with limits of not less than ONE 
MILLION DOLLARS AND NO/100 ($1,000,000.00) per person and TWO 
MILLION DOLLARS AND NO/100 ($2,000,000.00) per occurrence insur-
ing against any and all liability of the insured with respect to 
said premises or arising out of the maintenance, use of occupancy 
thereof, and property damage liability insurance with a limit of 
not less than TWO H U N D R E D T H O U S A N D DOLLARS AND NO/100 
($200,000.00) per accident or occurrence. All such bodily injury 
liability insurance and property damage liability insurance shall 
specifically insure the performance by Lessee of the indemnity 
agreement as to liability for injury to or death of persons and 
injury or damage to property described herein. 
XIII Lessee's Improvements. The Lessee further covenants 
and agrees that, from and after the earlier of the commencement 
date of the term hereof or the commencement of any business by 
the Lessee in the premises, -it will carry and maintain insurance 
covering all of Lessee's leasehold improvements, alterations, 
additions or improvements, trade fixtures, merchandise and per-
sonal property from time to time in, on or upon the premises, in 
an amount not less than eighty percent (80%) of their full re-
placement costs from time to time during the term of this Agree-
ment, providing protection against any peril included within the 
classification "Fire and Extended Coverage," together with insur-
ance against sprinkler damage, vandalism and malicious mischief. 
Any policy proceeds shall be used for the repair or replacement 
of the property damaged or destroyed unless this Agreement shall 
cease and terminate under the provisions described herein. 
XIV Lessor 1s Insurance. The Lessor shall at all times from 
and after the commencement date of the term hereof maintain in 
effect a policy or policies of insurance covering the building of 
which the premises are a part, in an amount not less than ninety 
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percent (90%) of full replacement costs for sprinkler damage, 
vandalism and malicious mischief. The Lessor's obligation to 
carry the insurance provided for herein may be brought within the 
coverage of any so called blanket policy or policies of insurance 
carried and maintained by Lessor, provided that the coverage 
afforded will not be reduced or diminished by reason of the use 
of such blanket policy insurance. Lessee agrees to pay Lessor 
for such insurance within 30 days after billing. 
XV Increase in Insurance Premiums. Lessee agrees that it 
will not at any time during the terra of" this Agreement carry any 
stock or goods or do anything in or about the premises which will 
in any way tend to increase the insurance rates upon the building 
of which the premises are a part. The Lessor acknowledges and 
agrees that there will be restaurants on the premises and such 
use shall not be considered to be an increased insurance cost or 
cause of cancellation of Lessorfs insurance. The Lessee agrees 
to pay to the Lessor forthwith upon demand the amount of any 
increase in premiums for insurance against loss by fire that may 
be charged during the term of this Agreement on the amount of 
insurance to be carried by Lessor on the building of which the 
premises are a part resulting from the foregoing or from Lessee 
doing any act in or about said premises which does so increase 
the insurance rates. If due to the occupancy, abandonment, or 
Lessee's failure to occupy the premises as herein provided, any 
insurance shall be cancelled by the insurance carrier or if the 
premiums for any such insurance shall be increased, then in any 
of such events the Lessee shall indemnify and hold Lessor harm-
less and shall pay on demand the increased cost of such insur-
ance . 
XVI Destruction of Leased Premises. If the premises are 
partially damaged by any casualty insurable under the Lessor's 
insurance policy. Lessor shall, upon receipt of the insurance 
proceeds, repair the same, and the applicable monthly lease 
payment of the premises shall be abated proportionately as to 
that portion of the premises rendered untenantable. If the 
premises by reason of such occurrence are rendered wholly unten-
antable, or should be damaged as a result of a risk which is not 
covered by the Lessor's insurance, or should be damaged in whole 
or in part during the last three (3) years of the term or any 
renewal term hereof, or the building (whether the premises are 
damaged or not) should be damaged to the extent of fifty percent 
(50J) or more of the then monetary value thereof, or damaged to 
such an extent that the premises cannot be operated as an integ-
ral commercial unit, then or in any of such events. Lessor may 
either elect to repair the damage or may cancel this Agreement by 
notice of cancellation within one hundred eight (180) days after 
such event and thereupon this Agreement shall expire, and Lessee 
shall vacate and surrender the leased premises to Lessor. Les-
see's liability for rent upon the termination of this Agreement 
shall cease as of the day following the event or damage. In the 
event Lessor elects to repair the damage insurable under Lessor's 
policies, any abatement or rent shall end five (5) day** after 
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notice by Lessor to Lessee that the leased premises have been 
repaired. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to abate 
percentage lease payments, but the computation of such payments 
shall be based upon the revised minimum lease payments as the 
same may be abated. Unless this Agreement is terminated by 
Lessor, Lessee shall repair and refixture the interior of the 
premises in a manner and to at least a condition equal to that 
existing prior to its destruction or casualty and the proceeds of 
all insurance carried by Lessee on its property and improvements 
shall be held in trust by Lessee for the purpose of said repair 
or replacement. 
XVII Condemnation of Leased Premises. If the whole of the 
premises shall be acquired or taken by eminent domain for any 
public or quasi-public use or purpose, then this Agreement and 
the terms hereof shall cause and terminate in any such event. If 
any part of the premises shall be taken as aforesaid, and such 
partial taking shall render that portion not so taken unsuitable 
for the business of Lessee then this Agreement and the terms 
hereof shall cease and terminate as aforesaid. If such partial 
taking is not extensive enough to render the premises unsuitable 
for the business of Lessee then this Agreement shall continue in 
effect except that the minimum lease payment shall be reduced in 
the same proportion that the floor area of the premises (includ-
ing basement) taken bears to the original floor area demised and 
Lessor shall, upon receipt of the award in condemnation, make all 
necessary repairs or alterations to the building so as to recon-
stitute the portion of the building not taken as a complete 
architectural unit, but such work shall not exceed the scope of 
the work to be done by Lessor in originally constructing said 
building, nor shall Lessor in any event be required to spend for 
such work an amount in excess of the net amount received by 
Lessor as damaged for the part of the demised premises so taken. 
"Net amount received by Lessor" shall mean that part of the award 
in condemnation proceedings which is free and clear to Lessor of 
any collection by mortgagees for the value of the diminished fee. 
If more than twenty (20) percent of the floor area of the premi-
ses shall be taken as aforesaid, Lessor may, by written notice to 
Lessee, terminate this Agreement, such termination to be effec-
tive as aforesaid. If this Agreement is terminated as provided 
in this paragraph the lease payment shall be paid up to the day 
that possession is so taken by public authority and Lessor shall 
make an equitable refund of any lease payment paid by Lessee in 
advance. 
XVIII Award . The Lessee shall not be entitled to and ex-
pressly waives all claim to any condemnation award for any tak-
ing, whether whole or partial, and whether for diminution in 
value of the leasehold or of the fee, although Lessee shall have 
the right, to the extent that the same shall not reduce Lessor's 
award, to claim from the condemnor, but not from Lessor, such 
compensation as may be recoverable by Lessee in its own right for 
damage to Lessee's business and trade fixtures, if such claim can 
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be made separate and apart from any award to Lessor and without 
prejudice to Lessor's award. 
XIX Right to Re-Enter. If the Lessee shall default in 
payment of the lease payments reserved hereunder for a period of 
twenty (20) days after any of the same shall have become due and 
payable as aforesaid, or if Lessee shall abandon or appear to 
abandon the premises or fail to conduct business therein for a 
period of seven (7) consecutive business days, or if default 
shall be made by Lessee in any of the other covenants and agree-
ments herein contained to be kept and fulfilled on the part of 
the Lessee (except with respect to the defaults specified herein) 
for a period of twenty (20) days after written notice of such 
default is given by the Lessor to the Lessee without action by 
the Lessee to remedy such default and continuance of such action 
to remedy such default to conclusion with reasonable diligence or 
if the Lessee makes any transfer, assignment, conveyance, sale, 
pledge or disposition, of all or a substantial portion of its 
property or removes a substantial portion of its personal proper-
ty from the premises other than by reason of an assignment or 
subletting of the premises permitted under this Agreement, or if 
the Lessee's interest herein shall be sold under execution then 
and forthwith thereafter the Lessor shall have the right, at its 
option and without prejudice to its premises, or the Lessor, 
without such re-entry may recover possession of the premises, and 
that after default be made in any of the covenants contained 
herein, the acceptance of lease payments or failure to re-enter 
by Lessor shall not be held to be a waiver of its right to termi-
nate this Agreement, and the Lessor may re-enter and take r sses-
sion thereof the same as if no rent had been accepted aftci such 
default. All of the remedies given to the Lessor in this para-
graph or elsewhere in this lease in the event of default by 
Lessee, are in addition to and not in derogation of all other 
rights or remedies to which Lessor may be entitled under the laws 
of the State of Utah, and all such remedies shall not be deemed a 
waiver of any other or further rights or remedies. 
XX Maintenance. Lessee shall be responsible for mainte-
nance, repair and replacement of all heating, ventilating, air 
conditioning, plumbing and electrical systems on said premises 
and all interior maintenance of the building; in addition. Lessee 
shall be responsible for all plumbing, mechanical, electrical and 
other maintenance related to swimming pools, and other special 
use equipment installed by Lessee. 
XXI Bankruptcy. To the full extent permissible under the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, specifically Section 365 thereof 
(11 U.S.C. 365) or any successor thereto, if Lessee shall file a 
voluntary petition in bankruptcy or take the benefit of any 
insolvency act or be dissolved or adjudicated a bankrupt, or if a 
receiver shall be appointed for its business or its assets and 
the appointment of such receiver is not vacated within sixty (60) 
days after such appointment, or if it shall make an assignment 
for the benefit of its creditors then and forthwith thereafter 
-10-
the Lessor shall have all of the rights provided herein in the 
event of non-payment. 
XXII Quiet Enjoyment. Lessee, upon payment of the lease 
payments and performing all of the terms on its part to be per-
formed, shall peaceably and quietly enjoy the premises. 
XXIII Force Majeure. The parties shall be excused for the 
period of any delay in the performance of any obligations here-
under, when prevented from so doing by cause or causes beyond 
their control which shall include, without limitation, all labor 
disputes, civil commotion, war, war-like operations, invasions, 
rebellion, hostilities, military or usurped power, sabotage, 
governmental regulations or controls, fire or other casualty, 
inability to obtain any material or services or through acts of 
God. Nothing contained in this paragraph or elsewhere in this 
Agreement shall be deemed to excuse or permit any delay in the 
payment of any sums of money required hereunder, or any delay in 
the cure of any default which may be cured by the payment of 
money. No reliance by Lessee upon this paragraph shall limit or 
restrict in any way Lessor's right to self-help as provided in 
this Agreement. No party shall be entitled to rely upon this 
paragraph unless it shall advise the other party in writing of 
the existence of any force majeure preventing the performance of 
an obligation within fifteen (15) days after the commencement of 
the force majeure. 
XXIV Enforcement of Lease Expenses. If it becomes necessary 
for either party hereto to enforce the covenants of this Lease, 
the defaulting party will pay to the other party all costs and 
attorney's fees that shall arise from enforcing this Agreement. 
XXV Strict Performance. It is mutually agreed that the 
failure of the Lessor or the Lessee to insist upon strict per-
formance of any of the covenants, restrictions or conditions of 
this Agreement, or to exercise any option herein covered, in any 
one or more instances, shall not be construed as a waiver or 
relinquishment of any such covenants, agreements, conditions or 
options, but the same shall be and remain in full force and 
effect. 
XXVI Binding Effect. It is further mutually covenanted and 
agreed that all covenants, agreements, conditions, stipulations, 
recitals and options or elections herein contained to be kept and 
performed by or given to and to be exercised by either party 
shall bind and inure to the benefits of the legal representative, 
successors and assigns of such party and to grantees of the 
Lessor, excepting that no assignment by or through the Agreement 
in violation of the provisions of this Agreement shall vest any 
rights in the assignee. 
*
X V I 1
 Notices. Notices and demands hereunder or pursuant to 
any statute or ordinance now or hereafter enforced shall be 
validly and sufficiently served, given or made if mailed in a 
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sealed envelope, postage prepaid, and if intended for the Lessee, 
addressed to the Lessee at 257 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, or if intended for the Lessor, addressed to the Lessor at 
1760 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, until either party 
shall designate by written notice a new address to which any such 
notice or demand shall thereafter be so addressed and mailed. 
Remedies. All rights and remedies of the Lessor or 
herein enumerated shall be cumulative, and none shall 
exclude any other right or remedy allowed by law. 
XXVIII 
Lessee 
XXIX General Provisions. No receipt of money by the Lessor 
Lessee after the termination of this Agreement or after the 
of any notice or after the commencement of any suit, or 
XXX Governing Law. This Agreement shall be construed, and 
the rights and obligations of the Lessor and Lessee shall be 
determined according to the laws of the State of Utah. 
XXXI Recordation. The parties to this Agreement agree that 
the Lessee shall not record this Lease. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto set 
their hands and seals on this the ^n» day of W\h^ • 
1 9 * ^ . 
• 
S. H. HORMAN & SONS. 
A Partnership 
By;
 f/, "PA7. Arr^rrL. 
Duly Authorized Off icer , 
-<f/#// LESS0R 
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and 
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, Inc., 
A Utah Corporation 
By: 
Duly Authorized Officer, 
LESSEE 
STATE OF UTAH 
} 55 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE } 
I hereby certify that on this day of , 
1981, personally appeared before me , 
a duly authorized officer of .S. M. Horman and Sons, a partner-
ship, and
 f a duly authorized 
officer of Downtown Athletic Club, Inc., a Utah corporation, 
known to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the 
within instrument, and acknowledged that they executed the same 
for the purposes therein contained. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set ray hand and official 
seal 
Notary Public Residing in 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
and 
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB. Inc., 
A Utah Corporation 
By: 'c^y-M.fr'VW 
Duly Authorize^ Officer, 
LESSEE 
STATE OF UTAH } 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE } 
of JfSfe^. I hereby certify that on this %f* day __ 
1981, personally appeared before me ^^V>^M v*->tau*»o" 
a duly auUttrrl^ zed officer of S. M. Horman and Sons, a partner-
ship, and y ^cs (~t,.Yoom , a duly authorized 
officer of Downtown Athletic Club, Inc., a Utah corporation, 
known to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the 
within instrument, and acknowledged that they executed the same 
for the purposes therein contained. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and official 
seal. 
r 
Notify Publi* Resi 
Sal-t Lake cVty, Ut 
ding 
ah 
in 
My Commission Expires: 
~ / • 
ILL" 'v 
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